Chinese President Xi Jinping will arrive in New Delhi on Saturday for the 18th BRICS Summit, making his first visit to India in seven years. The high-stakes engagement provides a major test of the cautious rapprochement between the two Asian powers after years of military confrontation and apparent diplomatic mistrust.
Xi’s visit, which comes amid efforts by India and China to normalise relations, will be closely watched for signs of whether the two countries can move beyond stabilisation of their ties towards a broader political and economic reset
The Chinese president is expected to hold a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at 6 pm on Saturday. The discussions are expected to cover the situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the wider boundary dispute and measures to expand trade and investment. The two sides seek to rebuild relations damaged by the 2020 military confrontation in eastern Ladakh.
The meeting assumes particular importance because Xi's last visit to India was in October 2019, when he held an informal summit with PM Modi in Mamallapuram near Chennai. Within months, the relationship deteriorated sharply following the deadly Galwan Valley clash in Ladakh in June 2020.
Since then, the two countries have spent years managing a military standoff, negotiating disengagement arrangements and maintaining diplomatic channels while economic relations also came under increasing strain.
The thaw that has emerged since 2024 has been cautious. Direct flights have resumed, some visa procedures have been eased, high-level political contacts have increased and the two sides have taken steps towards restoring border trade and people-to-people links.
But major obstacles remain. The unresolved boundary dispute, continued military deployments, strategic rivalry, a heavily unbalanced trade relationship and restrictions affecting investment, technology, equipment and business travel continue to constrain the relationship.
THE CRUCIAL SEVEN YEARS
Xi’s return to New Delhi comes after one of the most difficult phases in India-China relations in decades, marked by longstanding territorial disputes and deep strategic mistrust
The frontier concerns remain unresolved, with the two militaries maintaining large deployments along their roughly 3,500-kilometre high-altitude border. The biggest setback came in 2020, when clashes in eastern Ladakh killed 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers
The confrontation triggered a prolonged military standoff and a wider deterioration in political and economic ties. India tightened scrutiny of Chinese investments, restricted Chinese mobile applications and sought to reduce dependence on Chinese companies and technology
For several years, both governments focused largely on military and diplomatic negotiations to prevent further escalation along the LAC.
A significant shift came in October 2024, when India and China reached an understanding on patrolling arrangements, clearing the way for renewed political engagement between PM Modi and Xi
The two leaders subsequently held formal talks on the margins of the BRICS Summit in Kazan. PM Modi also visited China in August 2025, while direct flights resumed in October after more than five years. India eased visa procedures for Chinese business professionals, while both sides moved towards restoring border trade and allowing Indian pilgrims to resume the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra in Tibet.
Modi and Xi held further talks on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin in August 2025 and briefly interacted again at a regional forum in Kyrgyzstan earlier this month.
These steps have created a framework for a gradual thaw, but analysts remain cautious about calling it a full reset.
BORDER REMAINS AT THE HEART OF THE RELATIONSHIP
The Himalayan boundary remains the biggest challenge for Modi and Xi.
Both countries continue to maintain significant military forces along the frontier, making border management central to any normalisation effort. Recent diplomacy has focused on preventing incidents and creating mechanisms for longer-term negotiations.
In August, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval travelled to Beijing for the 25th round of Special Representatives' talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The discussions covered the boundary, maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border and broader measures to improve ties.
The two sides reached an eight-point consensus and agreed to advance discussions on an "Early and Substantial Harvest" involving boundary delimitation and border management. They have also discussed new Border Personnel Meeting Points and military hotlines.
Yet concerns persist over Chinese military activity in the eastern sector, including Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims as "South Tibet" or "Zangnan". China has also renamed several locations in the region and issued maps claiming Arunachal Pradesh as its territory, moves that have drawn strong rejection from India.
On September 6, Indian and Chinese commanders held the first Corps Commander-level meeting in the eastern sector at the Vacha-Damai Border Personnel Meeting Point. The meeting followed reports of fresh Chinese military activity and alleged incursions in the Taksing area of Upper Subansiri district.
ECONOMIC TIES RESILIENT
The sharpest contradiction in India-China ties is economic. Despite political tensions, trade has remained resilient. China is India’s largest goods trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching USD 151 billion in the 2025-26 financial year.
But the relationship is heavily skewed towards China. India imported USD 131 billion worth of goods from China, while exports stood at only USD 19 billion, producing a record trade deficit of USD 112 billion.
New Delhi has responded by promoting domestic manufacturing and seeking to reduce dependence on Chinese machinery, electronics, chemicals and industrial components.
Yet Chinese technology, equipment and components remain important to several key sectors. India, according to experts, therefore faces a paradox. It wants to reduce strategic dependence on China while still relying on Chinese inputs to expand domestic production.
The challenge is not simply to increase trade, but to make the economic relationship more balanced and predictable.
WATER AND INFRASTRUCTURE CONCERNS
India's concerns with China also extend beyond the border. A major issue is Beijing's Medog hydropower project on the upper reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo, which flows into India as the Brahmaputra
China began construction in July 2025 on the project in Tibet near the Arunachal Pradesh border, with an estimated investment of 1 trillion yuan, or about USD 137 billion.
The project is slated for commercial operation in 2033, with planned capacity of 60,000 megawatts and annual generation of about 300 billion kilowatt-hours.
India have raised concerns and sought greater transparency and ecological information-sharing, while Beijing has not released a comprehensive environmental impact assessment.
The project adds to Indian concerns over Chinese infrastructure near the disputed frontier and developments on rivers flowing downstream into India and Bangladesh.
BRICS AND THE BIG PICTURE
Xi’s visit is taking place primarily in the context of the 18th BRICS Summit, giving his engagement with PM Modi a wider geopolitical dimension.
BRICS provides India and China with a common multilateral platform as both navigate an increasingly volatile international environment. According to Chinese officials, Xi's participation reflects Beijing's commitment to BRICS and to what it describes as a more inclusive global order.
The summit is expected to address intra-BRICS trade, payment systems, science and technology, climate change and coordination on major international issues.
Exprts note that for China, maintaining a working relationship with India strengthens the credibility and effectiveness of these wider global groupings, also including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Beijing also sees BRICS as part of a broader effort to promote alternative institutions to those dominated by the United States.
India, however, has its own strategic calculations. New Delhi has deepened its security partnership with Washington and remains part of the Quad with the United States, Japan and Australia, an alignment Beijing views with suspicion.
India, meanwhile, remains concerned about China’s close relationship with Pakistan.
The result is a relationship where cooperation and competition coexist, where interests converge, while competing over security, technology, trade and regional influence, geopolitical experts observe.
THE US FACTOR
The changing international environment adds another layer to the PM Modi-Xi engagement.
Both India and China are dealing with volatile relations with the United States and the impact of American trade policies. This gives Beijing and New Delhi an incentive to maintain a functional relationship even where their strategic interests diverge.
Analysts argue that China's economic heft gives Beijing an opportunity to position itself as a reliable partner as both countries face the impact of US trade policies. Ashok Malik of The Asia Group has noted that Xi’s visit shows that, despite turbulence caused by the United States, India and China want to maintain a working relationship.
India’s partnership with Washington remains an important part of its security strategy, while China remains concerned about the Quad and India remains wary of Beijing’s ties with Pakistan.
TEST FOR PM MODI AND XI
The central question is no longer whether India and China want to talk. The real test is whether dialogue can generate enough confidence to address the obstacles that have accumulated since 2020.
A successful PM Modi-Xi meeting could provide momentum on border management, trade, investment and business mobility. The meeting between the leaders offers an opportunity to better align political and economic interests, although commercial ties will ultimately depend on the interests of businesses and citizens
For India, the key test will be whether China can contribute to a more stable border while providing greater predictability in trade and technology flows. For China, the challenge will be convincing India that deeper economic engagement will not create additional strategic vulnerabilities.
