Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and UAE leadership are set to meet in India during the BRICS Summit 2026, marking their first such encounter since the conflict erupted.
And the location matters.
India is hosting the meeting at a moment when the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf security, energy supplies and regional shipping are all under intense pressure.
For New Delhi, this is also a delicate diplomatic balancing act.
Iran and the UAE have maintained diplomatic and economic ties despite their differences, but the ongoing West Asia conflict has dramatically complicated the regional equation.
Pezeshkian's presence at the BRICS Summit gives Tehran an opportunity to engage with regional and global partners outside the traditional Western diplomatic framework.
The UAE, meanwhile, remains one of India's closest strategic and economic partners in the Gulf.
Having senior leadership from both sides in the same room gives India a potentially important diplomatic opening — even if New Delhi is not formally acting as a mediator.
India's position is particularly interesting because New Delhi has strategic interests with both Iran and the UAE.
Iran is crucial to India's connectivity plans. The Chabahar Port gives India an important route towards Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan.
The UAE, meanwhile, is a major Indian trade and investment partner and an important source of energy. Millions of Indians also live and work across the Gulf.
Any prolonged regional conflict therefore carries immediate consequences for India — from oil prices and shipping costs to the safety of Indian citizens abroad.
New Delhi cannot afford to pick one side and shut the other out.
The biggest concern is energy.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most important energy chokepoints. Any serious disruption could send oil prices higher and create major problems for countries such as India that rely heavily on imported energy.
That makes de-escalation in West Asia an economic priority for New Delhi, not simply a diplomatic one.
India's engagement with Iran and the UAE therefore serves a practical purpose: keep communication channels open and protect India's own strategic interests.
Iran is not just another diplomatic partner for India.
Chabahar is central to India's efforts to build an alternative trade and connectivity route to Central Asia.
The port allows India to bypass Pakistan geographically and strengthen its access to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets.
A prolonged conflict inside Iran or around its coastline could therefore complicate one of India's most important regional connectivity projects.
For New Delhi, stability in Iran is directly linked to its wider economic ambitions.
India's diplomatic strategy is increasingly about maintaining relationships with countries that may themselves be at odds.
New Delhi has deepening ties with the UAE and Gulf countries, while maintaining longstanding relations with Iran. It also has major strategic relationships with Israel, Russia and the United States.
That means India's role is less about choosing a camp and more about keeping every diplomatic door open.
The Modi-Pezeshkian meeting, combined with the expected Iran-UAE leadership interaction at BRICS, puts India in a unique position.
New Delhi may not be able to end the West Asia conflict.
But it can provide something the region desperately needs right now:
A room where rivals can still talk.
And with Hormuz, Chabahar, energy security and regional stability all at stake, India's BRICS diplomacy could matter far beyond the summit itself.
