Saudi Arabia is facing a problem it probably did not want — and certainly did not expect to confront quite this way.
The Iran-aligned Houthi movement in Yemen has rapidly expanded its control along the country's Red Sea coast, including strategically important positions around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints.
The escalation has pushed Riyadh into an increasingly uncomfortable search for military and intelligence support.
And the list of countries it is turning to tells its own story.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia's newly signed defence partner, has so far stopped short of committing forces to fight the Houthis inside Yemen. The United States has also resisted direct military intervention, offering intelligence and targeting assistance instead.
And now, according to reports cited by India Today, Saudi Arabia has indirectly approached Israel for intelligence assistance related to the threat around Bab el-Mandeb.
That is quite a geopolitical twist for a country that does not have diplomatic relations with Israel.
The latest escalation follows a rapid Houthi offensive along Yemen's western coastline.
According to Reuters, the Houthis have maintained control over much of Yemen's Red Sea coast after capturing strategically important areas, including Perim Island, which sits directly at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The group has also seized the strategic Red Sea port of Mocha, further strengthening its position along the maritime corridor. The advance represents the most serious fighting in Yemen since the relative calm created by the 2022 UN-brokered ceasefire.
The consequences extend far beyond Yemen.
The Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is a crucial route for ships travelling between the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal and European markets.
If the Houthis can effectively restrict shipping through the strait, they gain an enormous strategic lever.
And Saudi Arabia is particularly vulnerable.
The Bab el-Mandeb crisis comes at an especially dangerous moment for Riyadh because the Strait of Hormuz is already severely disrupted amid the wider US-Iran conflict.
Saudi Arabia has historically relied on its East-West pipeline to move oil from its eastern fields towards the Red Sea, allowing it to bypass Hormuz when necessary.
But that pipeline was itself hit in a recent drone attack that Riyadh attributed to Iranian-backed militias operating from Iraq.
Reuters reported that the pipeline could remain disrupted and that a prolonged shutdown could potentially affect as much as 4% of global oil supply while Hormuz remains largely blocked.
So Saudi Arabia is staring at a nightmare scenario:
Hormuz is restricted.
Bab el-Mandeb is threatened.
Its alternative oil route has been damaged.
And the Houthis are getting closer to controlling the Red Sea chokepoint.
That is why this is much bigger than another round of fighting in Yemen.
The Houthis have also stepped up missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia.
On Monday, the group said it launched dozens of missiles and drones at a military airbase in Khamis Mushait, targeting aircraft hangars, radar systems, runways and ammunition depots.
Saudi authorities issued emergency alerts in Khamis Mushait and three other southern cities.
The Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen said 13 civilians were wounded in the attacks.
The attacks followed Saudi and Yemeni government airstrikes against Houthi positions.
In other words, Yemen's civil war has effectively spilled into a much larger regional confrontation.
This is where Saudi Arabia's newly created Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is facing its first serious test.
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the agreement in August. The pact says that an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all three.
On paper, that sounds significant.
But the Houthi crisis has exposed an immediate question:
Does the agreement actually mean Pakistan will send troops to fight in Yemen?
Islamabad's answer so far is essentially: not so fast.
On September 10, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry said there had been no discussion of a military response under the Mecca pact following the Houthi attacks.
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan said:
“There is no such thing under discussion right now ... When time comes (we) will act under the agreement.”
Pakistan has condemned the attacks and warned Iran to rein in its Houthi allies, but it has not committed troops to offensive operations in Yemen.
That distinction matters enormously.
Pakistan has indicated that the pact could be used to defend Saudi territory.
But fighting the Houthis inside Yemen is a different proposition altogether.
The reluctance is understandable.
Saudi Arabia has already spent years fighting the Houthis. Riyadh led a military coalition that intervened in Yemen in 2015, but the conflict ultimately became an expensive and difficult war with no decisive victory.
Pakistan does not appear keen to inherit that problem.
Sending Pakistani troops into Yemen could also create a direct confrontation with Iran, which backs the Houthis.
Islamabad has historically tried to maintain working relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Entering Yemen militarily would make that balancing act substantially harder.
Reuters reported that Pakistan has also been trying to mediate between the US and Iran, making direct military involvement against an Iran-aligned group even more complicated.
So the much-hyped Mecca defence pact has encountered its first real-world stress test — and Islamabad's response so far has been cautious.
This is perhaps the most striking part of the story.
According to India Today, citing reporting from The Jerusalem Post and Israel Hayom, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has indirectly approached Israel through US Central Command (CENTCOM) seeking intelligence assistance related to the threat posed by the Houthis around Bab el-Mandeb.
Israel Hayom reported that the Saudi request was aimed at obtaining intelligence and other assistance that could help prevent the Houthis from blocking the strait.
This is significant because Saudi Arabia and Israel do not have formal diplomatic relations.
Saudi Arabia has also not officially recognised Israel as an independent state.
So if the reports are accurate, Riyadh is effectively seeking help through an indirect channel from a country with which it has no formal diplomatic relationship.
But there is an important caveat:
This should not be described as Saudi Arabia and Israel forming a military alliance.
The reporting concerns an alleged request for intelligence and assistance, not the creation of a formal Saudi-Israeli defence arrangement. There has also been no public announcement from Riyadh or Jerusalem confirming a new military partnership.
Because Israel has its own history with the Houthis.
Since the Gaza war began, the Houthis have repeatedly targeted Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea.
Their campaign severely affected traffic through the Red Sea and effectively crippled activity at Israel's Port of Eilat.
Israel has also conducted military operations against Houthi targets in Yemen.
So Saudi Arabia and Israel now have something unusual in common:
They both have a direct interest in preventing the Houthis from turning Bab el-Mandeb into a permanent military pressure point.
There is therefore a strategic logic behind intelligence cooperation even without formal diplomatic normalisation.
Israeli involvement would also carry enormous risks.
The Houthis could retaliate against Israeli cities.
They could intensify missile attacks.
And any visible Israeli military role in support of Saudi Arabia could create a political explosion across the region.
According to the reporting cited by India Today, any Israeli assistance is therefore more likely to remain focused on intelligence sharing rather than Israeli forces openly joining Saudi military operations.
Israeli defence officials have reportedly argued that any larger action against the Houthis should be undertaken as part of a broader international and regional coalition, rather than by Israel alone.
Saudi Arabia has not only been asking regional powers for help.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has also sought assistance from US President Donald Trump.
Reuters reported that the Saudi leader held at least two conversations with Trump on September 11 seeking help against the Houthis.
Washington, however, has so far resisted direct military intervention.
Instead, the US has offered intelligence-sharing and targeting assistance.
US Central Command chief Admiral Brad Cooper subsequently met Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah as the situation deteriorated.
That tells us something important about Washington's current calculation.
The US clearly does not want Saudi Arabia to be left completely alone.
But it also does not appear eager to launch another major military campaign in Yemen.
The most strategically important development isn't necessarily the attacks on Saudi cities.
It is the geography.
The Houthis are positioning themselves around one of the narrow gateways through which global trade moves.
Bab el-Mandeb is essentially the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
Control or disruption of that route affects:
Oil tankers
Container ships
European-Asian trade
The Suez Canal
Saudi oil exports
Egyptian shipping revenue
Global energy prices
And the Houthis know this.
Reuters reported that the group has said its blockade would continue against Saudi shipping, while vessels belonging to other countries could continue transiting.
That transforms the Houthis from a Yemeni insurgent force into a much larger regional economic threat.
When Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed their defence agreement, it was widely viewed as a major attempt to create a new regional security architecture.
But alliances are ultimately judged not by the ceremony at which they are signed.
They are judged when someone actually gets attacked.
And that test has arrived much sooner than expected.
Pakistan says the agreement remains intact and that it will act when the time comes.
But for now, Islamabad is not sending troops into Yemen. Türkiye has also remained outside the fighting.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is conducting airstrikes, seeking American assistance and reportedly exploring intelligence cooperation with Israel.
That leaves a very uncomfortable question hanging over the alliance:
If an attack on Saudi Arabia is supposedly an attack on all three members, where exactly is the line between defending Saudi territory and fighting the war that is producing those attacks?
The answer could determine whether the Mecca pact becomes a genuine regional security alliance — or simply another ambitious diplomatic agreement that looks much stronger on paper than it does on the battlefield.
This crisis is no longer contained to Yemen.
The Houthis are fighting Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is striking Yemen.
Iran remains closely linked to the Houthi movement.
The US is providing intelligence support but avoiding direct intervention.
Pakistan is trying to balance its defence commitments with its relationship with Iran.
Israel is reportedly being approached indirectly.
And Bab el-Mandeb is sitting right in the middle of all of it.
Reuters reported that crude prices rose more than 4% on Monday before settling around 1% higher, reflecting fears over the effect of the expanding conflict on global energy supplies.
If both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb remain severely disrupted at the same time, the consequences could extend far beyond the Middle East.
Shipping costs rise.
Insurance premiums rise.
Oil becomes more expensive.
Supply chains get longer.
Inflationary pressure increases.
And countries thousands of kilometres away begin feeling the consequences of a war they have no direct role in.
Saudi Arabia is not simply fighting another Houthi attack.
It is facing a strategic squeeze.
The Houthis have pushed closer to one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints. Pakistan is unwilling, at least for now, to send forces into Yemen. The United States is offering intelligence but resisting direct intervention. Türkiye is staying out. And Riyadh has reportedly reached, indirectly, towards Israel for intelligence assistance despite having no diplomatic relations with Jerusalem.
That is how serious the situation has become.
And the most important question now is not simply who wins the next battle in Yemen.
It is whether the Houthis can turn Bab el-Mandeb into a permanent bargaining weapon — and whether Saudi Arabia can stop them without dragging Pakistan, Türkiye, the US and potentially Israel into yet another full-scale Middle Eastern war.
Sources: India Today, Reuters, Israel Hayom, The Jerusalem Post, Al Jazeera and The Guardian.